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graphic research among Chinese migrants
in Hungary, a project that lasted until 2004
and included brief periods of research in
Russia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. These
migrants were, and are, entrepreneurs who
left China after 1989. Unlike other, earlier
strands of Chinese migration, which either
targeted traditional migration destinations
(North America, Western Europe, Southeast
Asia) and were largely based on family
sponsorship, or rich countries where
Chinese went as students (the US, Austra-
lia, Japan), these new entrepreneurial
migrants went to countries with no recent
tradition of Chinese immigration, but
where there was high demand for low-cost
consumer goods produced by China and a
lax regulatory environment. What enabled
this migration was the 1986 Law on Exit
and Entry Management, which liberalized
the issuance of passports, especially so-
called service passports, which could be
issued to any state employee travelling on
business. What propelled it was the situa-
tion of the Chinese economy in the late
1980s, when inflation combined with an
overproduction glut and state ‘work units’
attempted to trim their workforce by
encouraging employees to go into business
(‘plunge into the sea’) while retaining some
of their workplace benefits (such as hous-
ing, health care, and pensions). Between
1989 and 1992, a recession and fears of a
rollback of economic reforms were addi-
tional reasons for fledgling businesspeople
to want to leave the country.
It was precisely during this period that
entrepreneurial migration, before 1989
largely limited to shuttle trade across the
Soviet border, took on a mass scale and
became more permanent. The scale of the
migration was due in part to a historical
coincidence. It was exactly during these four
years of economic and political anxiety in
China that the collapse of state socialist
regimes in Eastern Europe created economic
and political conditions for Chinese immi-
gration: a brief window of liberal immigra-
tion policies (which in Hungary’s case went
as far as lifting the visa requirement for
Chinese citizens); the emergence of poorly
regulated free markets; and demand for
cheap consumer goods that domestic manu-
facturers were unable to satisfy. In addition,
rail tickets to Eastern Europe were cheap.
Stories about the fortunes made by early
migrants gave rise to an ‘Eastern Europe
fever’ that lasted until the mid-1990s. By
that time, sustained rapid growth of the
Chinese economy made staying at home
more attractive for fledgling entrepreneurs,
while growing competition, declining real
incomes, increasing bureaucratic hurdles
and less favourable exchange rates
decreased the appeal of Eastern Europe.
Nonetheless, due in part to the establish-
ment of ‘migration chains’ of relatives,
friends, and fellow villagers, in which early
migrants played the role of facilitators and
from which some of them profited finan-
cially, migration continued, expanding
beyond the early destinations (principally
Russia and Hungary) to the rest of Eastern
Europe. To date, while there are no reliable
data, researchers have estimated the
number of Chinese residing in Russia to be
between 200,000 and 400,000, and in Eastern
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Europe, excluding Russia, between 50,000
and 70,000 (Nyíri 2007a). Entrepreneurial
migration also began to other parts of the
world that were undergoing similar
economic transitions from closed, authori-
tarian systems to open economies, including
Cambodia and some South and Central
American states, but these other destina-
tions were not as popular as Eastern Europe
as they offered lower returns, and Chinese
migration to them attracted little attention
(see Nyíri and Saveliev 2002).
The sociodemographic profile, business
model, and ethnopolitical identity of the
new entrepreneurs showed certain shared
characteristics that were distinct from the
largely catering-based Chinese migrant
entrepreneurs in Western Europe, North
America, and Australia, and the small-scale
manufacturing economy of Chinese
migrants in Southern Europe, Mauritius,
and the Mariana Islands, which also devel-
oped in the 1990s. Surveys of these new
migrants showed that, on average, they
were more highly educated than their
predecessors (typically at the upper second-
ary, and sometimes the tertiary level),
having largely left behind skilled jobs. Some
had tried their hand at small-scale private
entrepreneurship in China, but most had
been state employees. Initially, most came
from the large urban centres and the north-
eastern region closest to the Russian border
but, as time passed, migrants from rural
regions in Zhejiang Province, with tradi-
tional migratory connections to Western
Europe, and Fujian Province established
migration chains that gradually increased
their share of the population. From the shut-
tle trade of the early years – which involved
selling goods brought from China in a
market or on a street and then returning to
China for the next consignment – the
migrants rapidly progressed to a structure
that is defined by a network of larger and
smaller ‘Chinese markets’. These markets
function as regional, national, or local clear-
inghouses for consumer goods (principally
clothing, shoes, toys, household textiles, and
electrical appliances) and other merchandise
(such as hardware) imported by Chinese
merchants and sold to Chinese distributors,
Chinese and local shopkeepers, and end
consumers. From these markets, the
merchandise travels to ‘Chinese shops’,
which in some countries (such as Hungary)
have emerged as the principal consumer
goods retail outlets in villages and poor
urban neighbourhoods, or to shops run by
locals or other migrant entrepreneurs (such
as Vietnamese in the Czech Republic).
Although authorities in some countries
(such as Russia) have tried to force Chinese
merchants out of the markets, while in
others (such as Hungary) higher-end
commercial centres have opened to accom-
modate more upmarket Chinese stores, the
markets remain the mainstay of the Chinese
commercial networks. The share of Chinese
businesses in the consumer goods sector is
considerable: according to a survey, the
‘Chinese markets’ alone accounted for 39
percent of clothing retail sales in Hungary in
2001. Equally significant is the dependence
of rural populations in parts of Eastern
Europe on the network of ‘Chinese shops’
for their daily consumer goods needs (Nyíri
2007b).
This partial transformation of the
Chinese into ‘essential outsiders’, a term
applied by Chirot and Reid (1997) to
Chinese in Southeast Asian and Jews in
Central European history, did not fail to
produce hostility. According to an annual
representative survey, 70 to 80 percent of
Hungarians are opposed to Chinese immi-
gration, and in 2006, a group of Russian
students firebombed Moscow’s largest
‘Chinese market’. The symbolic role of the
threatening outsider played by the Chinese
in the nationalist politics of some Eastern
European countries is similarly reminiscent
of historical anti-Semitism and ‘yellow peril’
discourses. Thus, in 2006, Hungary’s main
opposition party (now the ruling party)
made opposing Chinese immigration an
election campaign issue, even though the
share of Chinese in Hungary’s population
barely exceeds 15,000, or 0.15 percent.
Chinese (as well Indian, Syrian, Greek,
and other) merchants in various colonial
and imperial economies have been said to
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occupy the position of ‘middleman minori-
ties’: groups that functioned as economic
and political intermediaries between the
rulers and the populace but were regarded
as outsiders by both. The term ‘middleman
minority’ was popular in American sociol-
ogy in the 1980s, but fell out of favour with
the rise of literature on diaspora and tran-
snationalism in the 1990s.
I found that the position of Chinese
migrants in Eastern Europe showed some
remarkable similarities to that of the colo-
nial ‘middleman minorities’, particularly as
described by Edna Bonacich (1973). The
latter’s economic strategy relied on the flexi-
ble mobilization of cross-border ethnic
networks in order to obtain labour, capital,
and business information, which enabled
them to provide goods and services other-
wise unavailable, or available only at a
higher price, to both colonial rulers and
subjects. This strategy was made possible by
the kind of pioneer spirit and acceptance of
hardship that drove the Chinese peddler to
African and Siberian villages and by a capi-
talism whose transnational organization
preceded that of the mainstream global
economy – both features frequently cele-
brated in overseas Chinese literature. At the
same time, this strategy was also one
imposed onto migrants by the hostility they
faced in their societies of residence, which
blocked other, accepted paths of upward
mobility. In order to remain competitive,
they had to keep costs down. Therefore, and
because of their legal vulnerability to expul-
sion, they were inclined to take on economic
roles or methods seen as deviant (such as
usury). This led to an increased identifica-
tion of the entire group with a particular
business and the cementing of a view of it as
an economic – as well as a moral and a
sanitary – threat. While middlemen
merchants strove to cultivate good relations
with village populations as well as native
and colonial elites and were often recog-
nized as useful, they were always seen as
alien.
Of course, contemporary Chinese
networks in Eastern Europe display a
number of important differences from their
colonial predecessors. They do not collect
taxes on behalf of the rulers; they do not
collect primary products or provide credit,
functions Chinese still maintain in some
colonies and ex-colonies (such as French
Polynesia and Sarawak; see, for example,
Trémon 2009; Yao 2002); they do not distrib-
ute opium; and their trade networks do not
connect to those of the colonial rulers, who
until late in the colonial days had a monop-
oly on foreign trade. Instead, contemporary
Chinese migrant entrepreneurs have been
heavily dependent on China in ways their
predecessors were not.
Colonial ‘middlemen minorities’
marshaled trade between the colonies and
the metropoles and made use of China
largely as a source of labour. For contempo-
rary migrants, China is a source of labour,
merchandise, and capital. In the early 1990s,
when foreign trade was still largely
conducted by state enterprises that received
incentives for creating overseas markets, the
most successful Chinese businesses in East-
ern Europe were those that benefited from
easy credit from their suppliers in China. In
many cases, they were themselves former or
even current employees of these state enter-
prises or had other privileged connections
to them. They were thus not private entre-
preneurs in the strict sense, but part and
parcel of the mixed economy that is charac-
teristic of the post-1978 People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and was particularly emblem-
atic of the 1990s. Such arrangements were
largely discontinued by the late 1990s, when
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji took measures
to  limit the losses state enterprises had
sustained by extending bad credit overseas,
but migrants continued to search for sources
of credit in China in both the form of private
investments and bank loans, the latter still
largely connected to official backing.
Increasingly, they also tried to become
middlemen of another kind, inserting them-
selves as brokers between Chinese and local
elites, offering to match Chinese capital
(including concessional loans and grants
classified as state-to-state aid) with local
political patronage in deals ranging from
mining to telecommunication technology
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contracts, or promising Eastern European or
African exporters access to the Chinese
market via privileged political connections.
Seeking the patronage of local political
elites in exchange for protection against
xenophobic attacks and the vulnerability
created by legal discrimination was typical
of colonial ‘middleman minorities’ and
persisted in some postcolonial states such as
Indonesia under Soeharto. The pattern that
Donald Nonini, in his work on Indonesia,
calls ‘predatory clientelism’ (2004) has been
perhaps best portrayed in Graham Greene’s
1940 novel, 
 
Heart of Darkness
 
, in which the
actions of the Syrian merchant who corrupts
the ‘clean’ chief of police, Scobie, in a British
colony in West Africa have no alternative
because colonial officialdom as well as
locals 
 
expect
 
 Syrian merchants to be corrupt
a priori, and have no room for those who
attempt to conduct their business in an
‘honest’ fashion. The strategies of today’s
Chinese migrant entrepreneurs, who wine
and dine Hungarian customs officials (or
Cambodian police officers) and treat them
to expenses-paid trips to China, are simi-
larly both consequence and cause of local
expectations that they should be corrupt
and cunning. But the rise of China as a
coveted market and the increase of its clout
as a world power have made the power
dynamics of such patronage networks more
complex. ‘[M]arketing the privileged space
between command and competitive econo-
mies’ (Jensen 2007: 308) – a strategy whose
usefulness is magnified by the mutual exag-
geration of the Other’s cultural and political
inscrutability – enables these migrants to
became conduits of China’s globalization
and engenders a very intense kind of tran-
snationalism, characterized by a continuous
insertion in China’s economic, and in the
case of large businesses, political networks
and a high degree of mobility between the
country (or countries) of residence and
China. The appearance of Chinese organiza-
tions closely connected to China’s embassies
and provincial or county authorities in the
native place was related to this fact and
resulted in the export to Eastern Europe of a
genre of celebrations and a discourse of
politics and nationhood specific to the late
PRC.
In a nutshell, this is what I found in
Eastern Europe and described in my books.
For a while, it appeared to be a place- and
time-specific pattern borne out of a coinci-
dence between China’s economic and politi-
cal climate in the early 1990s, the abrupt
transition from planned to market economy
in Eastern Europe, and a brief window of
liberal immigration policies. Indeed, in the
2000s, this migration abated. Yet as informa-
tion began trickling in on Chinese entrepre-
neurs in Africa and other ‘developing
countries’ as a result of a sudden interest in
China’s role in the Southern Hemisphere
since the mid-2000s, the Eastern European
pattern appeared to be replicated around
the globe. Networks of Chinese importers
and shopkeepers were reported to have
sprung up in places as diverse as Argentina,
Cape Verde, and Papua New Guinea. In
some countries, like Suriname and Belize, I
observed them myself.
Although these destinations were not
experiencing the same dramatic political
transformation as Eastern Europe at the turn
of the 1990s, many of them were undergoing
a shift from more or less planned to more
free-market based economies and had large
low-income populations, and some were
emerging from violent conflicts, offering a
combination of opportunity and need for the
same kind of products and strategies that had
already been successful in Eastern Europe.
(In some cases, the opportunity was of a
different nature: thus, in Argentina, the
expansion of Chinese stores appears to have
coincided with the financial meltdown in the
late 1990s, which triggered the bankruptcy of
many local businesses and impoverished a
large segment of society.) Thus it makes sense
that the business model, range of goods, and
mode of insertion into the local economy
employed by new Chinese businesses were
very similar to those observed in Eastern
Europe, and may well have been directly or
indirectly inspired by experiences of Chinese
migrants to Eastern Europe. (As early as the
second half of the 1990s, some Chinese busi-
nessmen in Hungary set up contacts with
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Chinese in Africa and South America to
dispose of unsold stock, taking advantage of
the complementarity of the seasons between
the two hemispheres and making use of
kinship and native-place connections, partic-
ularly among migrants from Fujian.) The
appearance of these networks has elicited
both praise for supplying a large number of
Africans with consumer goods – including
ones as simple as shoes – that had until now
been unaffordable (e.g. Østbø Haugen and
Carling 2005) and hostility, including the full
list of accusations known from Eastern
Europe: unfair competition, smuggling, infe-
rior quality, illegal immigration, ruining
local industries, taking local jobs, and simply
‘invading’ foreign countries by virtue of
sheer numbers, if not already then surely in
the immediate future. Even more than in
Eastern Europe, Chinese shopkeepers have
also been subjected to physical hostility in a
number of African and Pacific countries.
 
1
 
To interpret these similar experiences, it
is essential to note another shared character-
istic of new destination countries in which
Chinese entrepreneurial migrants found
themselves. Not only do the economic envi-
ronments of these states display certain
common structural features, they also share
a lack of concern for integrating immigrants
into their labour markets, political systems,
or formal social structures, a feature that sets
them apart from richer European, North
American, Asian, and Australasian destina-
tion countries. Unlike in these richer coun-
tries, the migrants, for their part, see little
benefit in seeking jobs, education, or welfare
locally. Instead, they seek to send their chil-
dren to universities in countries like Canada,
Australia, or the US, in the hope that they will
land jobs with multinational corporations.
Some aim to acquire immigrant status in one
of those countries themselves in order to have
access to their health care systems and
vaguely plan to enjoy their natural environ-
ments and multicultural societies after they
retire.
So far, there are very few studies of this
new Chinese entreprenariat outside Eastern
Europe: only Østbø Haugen and Carling
(2005) and Dobler (e.g. 2008) have published
detailed studies of them in Africa, while
information on Southeast Asia (Laos,
Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand), South and
Central America, the Middle East, Central
Asia and the Pacific is anecdotal and limited
to journalistic accounts, Internet posts, and
highly unreliable estimates of numbers. This
anecdotal evidence, however, seems to
underscore yet another characteristic known
from studies of Eastern Europe: the
extremely high mobility and transnational
connectedness of some of these migrant
entrepreneurs. Indeed, one of my informants
has opened businesses in Romania and
Morocco while maintaining a home in
Hungary, and now shuttles among these
three. Another set up branches of his foot-
wear imports company in South America
with the help of relatives who had migrated
there. A third has moved from France to
Hungary, then to Cameroon, and currently
lives in Uganda. Discussions on Chinese-
language online forums such as
www.chineseinafrica.com and http://afri-
cawindows.com testify to a very high mobil-
ity of entrepreneurs across African
countries. An entrepreneur I talked to in
Cambodia told me of his plan to move to
North Korea as soon as the market there
opens up. All of this suggests the emergence
of a global entreprenariat, linked by multi-
functional business networks, high mobility
and dense flows of capital, goods and infor-
mation, while retaining a marginal social
status within local societies. At the same
time, in countries adjacent to China, such as
Laos, Burma, or the Central Asian countries,
entrepreneurial migration may be character-
ized by a much more local pattern that is
essentially an extension of business migra-
tions within China. Thus, traders I talked to
in Northern Laos tended to either come
across the border from Yunnan or have
moved there first from Hunan or Sichuan.
The future of this new transnational
middleman minority is hard to predict. In
Eastern Europe, the earliest migrants are
beginning to retire, but the life-choices of their
children, which will influence the retirement
plans of the parents, are as yet unclear. Some
have fulfilled their parents’ hopes and found
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jobs in North America; others have moved to
China; and a few have stayed in the countries
of their childhood. But research I conducted
in Laos and Cambodia in 2008 suggests that
the clientelistic strategy pursued by migrant
entrepreneurs is already leading to discern-
ibly different modalities of social insertion in
those countries that purport to enforce
‘modern’ norms of governance, such as
Hungary, and in those where rent-seeking is
an entrenched and institutionalized element
of the political economy, such as Cambodia.
Thus, despite 15 to 18 years of cultivating
figures of minor authority and achieving
modest success in their businesses, my infor-
mants in Hungary have few local friends,
speak little Hungarian, do not follow local
politics, and though their resident status has
been obtained legally, they have little hope or
desire to acquire Hungarian citizenship, a
procedure that requires a language and civic
test. In the terminology of the European
Union, which Hungary as a member state is
required to subscribe to even though it
remains irrelevant to its government as well
as its public discourse, they are ‘not inte-
grated’. By contrast, a businesswoman who
migrated from China to Cambodia at about
the same time as her peers settled in Hungary,
told me that she obtained an identity card and
a passport soon after having moved there for
$230, and has since developed widespread
networks of personal and political connec-
tions among Phnom Penh’s Cambodian and
Western elites even as she maintains close
connections with the Chinese embassy and
other new migrants. These networks serve
economic ends, but they have social and
emotional significance. As she told me: 
 
My mother-in-law wants me to move to
her house in France and let my son go
to school there. … But where else
would I have the lifestyle I have here?
Could I have a villa or a fruit orchard of
my own in France? Could I go out danc-
ing with my friend the Khmer princess?
 
The fact that this woman holds three
passports – Chinese, Cambodian, and French
– is illegal, as Chinese law does not allow dual
citizenship, yet rather than compromising
her status in any of these three elites, it actu-
ally facilitates it. Another entrepreneur, who
moved from Hong Kong to Cambodia in the
mid-1990s, has a Cambodian diplomatic
passport as the vice-premier’s advisor and is
the head of Cambodia’s Olympic Committee,
while simultaneously being a member of a
provincial People’s Political Consultative
Conference in China. His official privileges in
both China and Cambodia have enabled him
to negotiate a major loan for a Cambodian
irrigation project from China’s Export-
Import Bank, much of which will be under-
taken by his company. Clientelist relations
formed by less privileged Chinese migrants
at lower levels of Cambodia’s power struc-
tures nonetheless also permit them some
forms of recognition and create webs of local
social embeddedness, which are absent in
countries like Hungary.
As mentioned earlier, new Chinese
migrant entrepreneurs are often blamed for
entrenching, or even creating, a culture of
rent-seeking or indeed a criminalization of
the economy (see Nyíri [2007a] on Eastern
Europe; Mengin [2007] on Cambodia; Alden
 
et al
 
. [2008] and Guerrero and Manji [2008]
on Africa; and Tjon Sie Fat [2009] on Suri-
name). This perception is one of the reasons
for local populations’ antagonism towards
the migrants. Yet it appears that, in Cambo-
dia, where rent-seeking corporatism is a
more or less openly accepted principle of
the way society operates (see Bayart 
 
et al
 
.
2004), it enables the relatively smooth
incorporation of migrant entrepreneurs.
Although at present the division between
Cambodia’s local-born ethnic Chinese (the
Sino-Khmer) and new migrants from China
is quite clear and not without tension, this
form of incorporation in fact appears quite
similar to that which enabled the integration
of Chinese entrepreneurs throughout the
19th and early 20th centuries into both
Cambodian (and Thai) elites and rural soci-
ety, eventually creating distinct Sino-Khmer
(and Sino-Thai) identities. This type of
incorporation is not available in polities that
formally insist on liberal democratic norms
of ‘good governance’ and, more fundamen-
tally, on the equal, undifferentiated, and
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individual political membership of all
citizens along with the exclusion of non-citi-
zens from such membership. While the
former set of norms is a recent development
and is ideologically contested, the latter is
essential to the concept of modern statehood
since at least the early 20th century. In poli-
ties that follow these norms, any recognition
of immigrants who have not proved them-
selves ‘deserving’ in the light of public and
bureaucratic scrutiny must remain hidden.
The more actual practices involving
migrants are said to deviate from the policy
ideals of ‘good governance’, i.e. the more
allegations of incompetence, corruption,
and clientelism circulate concerning the
immigration, customs, and trade bureaucra-
cies, the more compelled governments of
such states are to compensate these and
demonstrate their good standing as ‘mature’
nation-states by periodic crackdowns, such
as sudden restrictions of visa or customs
procedures or highly publicized raids on
markets, which disadvantage migrant entre-
preneurs but may be followed by quiet
adjustments of the patronage networks
and/or by equally sudden relaxation of the
policy (see Nyíri [2007b] for Hungary; Tjon
Sie Fat [2009] for Suriname). Although the
effects of such measures in terms of their
declared aims (such as rooting out the infor-
mal economy) are often limited, they do
have the effect of making the acceptance of
‘undeserving’ migrant entrepreneurs
socially impossible, thus blocking their
access to social (though not economic) capi-
tal. Even though they are ostensibly
designed to ascertain the loyalty and degree
of ‘integration’ of society’s new members,
they actually impede the development of
informal social and emotional attachment.
This is particularly significant in cases such
as Hungary’s, where avenues for the recog-
nition of migrants do not exist outside strat-
egies of assimilation.
The situation is similar to the contrast-
ing histories of Chinese entrepreneurs in the
settler societies of much of Central and
South America (which, like the states of
Eastern Europe today, were on the periph-
ery of the Western nation-state system)
versus those in the Southeast Asian colonies
in the early 20th century. As McKeown
(2008: 327) writes about the former, 
 
International pressure, lack of domestic
resources, and the inability to mediate
between demands for sovereign regula-
tion and liberal intercourse often
caused weaker nations to swing wildly
from periods of harsh and absolute
exclusion to periods of massive immi-
gration through smuggling, special
privileges, and poorly enforced laws.
 
During the same period, in the colonies
and protectorates of Southeast Asia (as well
as Africa), the indirect governance of
migrants through headmen such as the
‘Kapitan China’, compulsory membership
in native-place institutions such as the
French 
 
congrégation
 
 system, and customary
law persisted (although here too it was
under pressure as the colonial authorities
tasked themselves with building modern
nation-states for their subjects), and migrant
entrepreneur elites retained a chance of
being incorporated into local court elites
through the granting of honorary titles.
These ‘segregated communal societies,’ as
Prasenjit Duara (2009: 166) writes, ‘while
typically hierarchical within, are formed of
networks, supports and alliances that
provide for … channels of upward mobil-
ity’. Although the modalities of incorpora-
tion – the formation of ‘hybrid’ Sino-Khmer,
Sino-Thai, and Chinese-Filipino groups, the
solidification of ethnic borders in Malaysia
and the continued predatory clientelism of
Indonesia – varied widely, these entrepre-
neuriats proved more resilient and more
‘rooted’ in their chosen countries over the
years than those on the western periphery,
which by today have largely disappeared
through migration to North America,
Australia, and Western Europe.
Unlike in Hungary, where the state
insists on direct and formal (though of
course not actual) undifferentiated control
of all foreigners on its territory, Chinese
associations in Cambodia and Laos are
once again being informally asked to exer-
cise certain control functions over recent
Chinese migrants, particularly when there
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 04
:32
 10
 D
ece
mb
er 
20
11
 
 152
 
Pál Nyíri
 
is a perception that conflicts (of a criminal
or economic nature) are rising or simply
that ‘things are getting out of hand’. Such
informal requests can come from either
Cambodian/Lao or Chinese officials, and
the associations, much as they were in the
first half of the 20th century, are perceived
by both sides as vehicles of mediation. In
Laos, as elsewhere, the Chinese embassy
initiated the establishment of a Lao-
Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 2005 to
unite managers of larger migrant-owned
businesses. According to its president, the
embassy would like the association to help
‘manage’ small-scale Chinese migrant trad-
ers who mostly do not have business
permits in Laos and are the subject of
some concern within the Lao government
so that they ‘do not damage China’s repu-
tation’. In Cambodia, the French 
 
congréga-
tion
 
 system was essentially revived during
the last years of the Cambodian People’s
Party’s (CPP) party-state regime, when the
party’s leadership tasked the Sino-Khmer
business elite with helping rebuild the
economy. Since the CPP returned to power
shortly after the UN intervention, the elab-
orate patronage networks that link govern-
ment officials to Sino-Khmer entrepreneurs
via this system of native-place based asso-
ciations have become stronger. These are
now supplemented by a Chinese Chamber
of Commerce and other associations that
are expected to act as go-betweens for new
migrant entrepreneurs and the Chinese
embassy as well as the government and to
‘sort out problems’. Although associations
for Chinese and local citizens are in princi-
ple separate, in reality Chinese entrepre-
neurs, regardless of their citizenship, are
expected by both governments to exercise
the function of transnational brokers. This
tacit sharing of sovereignty, another mani-
festation of which is the emergence of
Chinese-run concessions – such as the
Golden Boten and Golden Lotus Flower
casinos in Northern Laos – erodes the
boundaries of citizenship and allows the
absorption of newly arrived entrepreneurs
through dense patronage networks.
Twenty years ago, Chinese entrepre-
neurial migration to Eastern Europe seemed
like a temporary phenomenon generated by
a particular historical moment in both
regions with a very specific configuration of
social, political, and economic factors.
Today, this phenomenon is global in scope,
with significant similarities across the group
of migrants involved and equally significant
differences in their incorporation into vari-
ous societies. As such, it allows us an
unusual comparative view of state practices
of ‘integration’ and sheds perhaps unex-
pected light on changing practices of sover-
eignty.
 
Note
 
1. See Guerrero and Manji (2008) or Alden 
 
et al
 
.
(2008) for recent overviews of attitudes to
Chinese migrants in Africa. As of the time of
writing, the most recent example of violence
against ‘new Chinese’ shopkeepers was reported
in May in Papua New Guinea. It was large-scale
enough to result in the killing of six looters by
police. See AAP (2009).
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